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Abstract: 
This paper investigates how parties can influence the level of political sophistication their 
supporters have. Although the importance of parties in providing their supporters with 
political information was suggested since the early studies of voting behavior, this level of 
analysis has been omitted from individual studies of political sophistication. Focusing on 
the political environment of post-communist societies, where parties played a key role in 
helping citizens understand politics, I theorize both a direct and indirect path through 
which parties can contribute to the level of sophistication of their supporters. Using 
cross-national data from the Eurequal 2007 project on 13 post-communist countries I 
show that three characteristics related to parties' motivation to mobilize the electorate 
against the status quo have an impact on individual level political sophistication. Results 
from a multilevel model suggest that supporting a non-incumbent, smaller, or right-wing 
party, is related, either directly or in interaction with individual characteristics, to higher 
levels of political Introduction 
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 Throughout the political science literature scholars have been paying much 
attention to the individual-level determinants of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990; Zaller, 1990). But along these lines researchers have provided 
very little direct evidence of how an important institution, the party, can impact citizens’ 
political sophistication. More specifically, previous studies only highlighted that party 
supporters are generally more sophisticated than non-partisans (e.g. Converse, 1964; Delli 
Carpini and Keeter ,1996; Grönlund and Milner, 2006), but no research so far has 
examined how party characteristics impact the level of political sophistication of partisans. 
 Early studies of voting behavior demonstrated that parties have a specific role in 
increasing the level of political sophistication of the public by providing their supporters 
with information and cues that would help them evaluate the remote world of politics 
(Campbell et al., 1960). This role is even more evident when we think of the important 
linkage functions that parties have in society, i.e. creating a substantive connection 
between citizens and policy makers (Eldersveld and Walton, 2000; Epstein, 1986; Katz, 
1990; Merkl, 2005) - here is where the “educating” role that parties have is even more 
noticeable (Eldersveld and Walton, 2000; Katz 1990).   Furthermore, it has been pointed 
out that the degree to which citizens understand politics is dependent on the quantity and 
clarity of cues provided by political elites (Craig and Hurley, 1984; Jacoby, 1995; Nie and 
Rabjohn, 1979). Other than this directly employed mechanism, the impact of the parties 
on political sophistication can also be viewed as a two-step process. Given that one of 
their main roles is to mobilize their supporters (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994) this will lead to an increase in 
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citizens’ level of participation which, in turn, contributes to an increase in their level of 
political sophistication (Bennett, 1975; Junn, 1991; Leighley, 1995; Tan, 1980).  
Consequently, it is logical to assume that depending on specific characteristics 
some parties are better able to provide cues and have more successful mobilization 
strategies. So, the amount and quality of information that they provide to their supporters 
- both through direct communication and through the mobilization process - varies 
across parties. For these reasons I argue that bringing political parties in the picture will 
provide substantial knowledge that can explain part of the variance in political 
sophistication. 
In this paper I make the case that political parties can contribute to the level of 
political sophistication of their supporters. The causal path between supporting a certain 
party and the level of political sophistication might be questioned. But I will argue that 
reverse causality is implausible since partisanship is remarkably stable over time and 
rather immune to short term forces (Back and Teorell, 2009; Campbell et al., 1960; 
Converse, 1969; Dalton, 1980; Green and Palmquist, 1994; Green et al., 2002; Goren, 
2005; Schickler and Green, 1997; Zuckerman et al., 2007); hence it is highly unlikely that 
changes in the level of political sophistication will lead to a change in partisanship.  
Therefore, even if it has been previously shown that citizens choose to vote for a party 
based on their level of political knowledge (Bartles, 1996; Oscarsson, 2007; Toka and 
Popescu, 2008), once they become supporters, the parties can further influence their level 
of political sophistication.  
 Evidence pointing to the fact that supporters of a certain party are paying 
attention to the message of elites comes from research in voting behavior which shows 
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that parties have a significant impact on the policy position of their supporters (Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998; Ray, 2003; Zaller, 1992). Therefore, if voters respond to shifts in party 
positions and follow the position of their party, the theoretical possibility of them paying 
attention to a certain party message and hence becoming more politically sophisticated 
becomes clearer. 
Furthermore, with regards to the post-communist countries included in this study, 
I expect the relationship between supporting a certain party and sophistication to be even 
stronger, given that in these countries political parties and political elites had an 
important role in providing citizens with information that would help them understand 
the new rules of a rapidly changing game (Enyedi and Toka, 2007). 
The relationship between supporting a certain party and political sophistication 
will be tested for 12 post-communist countries1 from the Euroequal dataset. By using 
multilevel models, I show that three party characteristics (position on the left-right axis, 
incumbency and party size) have either an unconditional or a moderating effect, through 
interaction with media usage and education, on individual level political sophistication.  
Political sophistication in a traditional perspective 
First of all, considering that political knowledge, political sophistication, political 
awareness and political information are used interchangeably in the public opinion 
literature (Zaller, 1990), the notion of ‘political sophistication’ needs to be clarified. The 
concepts of political knowledge/sophistication have been operationalized in a variety of 
ways that take into consideration more specific or general information about politics. The 
most widely employed indexes use the summation of correct answers to factual 
knowledge questions (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996l Zaller, 1992). In this paper a 
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broader operationalization of political sophistication will be used. Political knowledge, as 
a summation of correct answers to factual knowledge questions, is considered an 
imperfect measure of political sophistication (Zaller, 1990). Thus, in addition to political 
knowledge, this broader operationalization used in the current study incorporates political 
interest and political cognitions in the same unidimensional concept (Lau and Erber, 
1985;  Zaller, 1990). Since all three items reflect the degree to which individuals pay 
attention and understand political events (Zaller, 1990), we can expect them to be 
influenced by the same factors and have the same theoretical implications.  
Traditionally political knowledge/sophistication was analyzed in single country 
environments, emphasizing individual characteristics. Most studies start from the ability-
motivation-opportunity triad that promotes any type of behavior including the 
acquisition of information among individuals (Luskin, 1990). Ability refers to cognitive 
skills, and determines how easy information learning is for individuals. Motivation (the 
desire to learn) determines to what degree individuals seek information and how much 
attention they pay to it. Finally, opportunity (the availability of information and its form) 
influences how easy it is for citizens to learn in a certain environment (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996, 179; Luskin, 1990).  
From this basic triad, a series of individual variables have been used in several 
models that attempt to explain political sophistication. Cognitive capability is 
operationalized as years of formal education (Luskin, 1990), which is the best proxy for 
cognitive abilities that is widely available in large-scale surveys and is the best single 
predictor of sophistication (Luskin, 1990; Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Motivation is 
measured using indicators of political interest, attention to political news and political 
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discussion. Opportunity, on the other hand, refers to more contextual factors that lie 
largely outside the individual’s control (Luskin, 1990). It is operationalized using variables 
related to the respondent’s informational and political environment (Luskin, 1990; 
Carpini and Keeter, 1996).2 
But this approach is incomplete, and the most compelling evidence for this comes 
from the fact that, even the most complex models, using only individual level variables, 
do not do a very good job in explaining the variation of political sophistication (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990; Zaller, 1990). Therefore, institutional variables 
need to be brought into the picture to help explain the variation of political 
sophistication. In this paper I investigate the role of party characteristics as possible 
predictors of the variation in individual level political knowledge. 
The effect of parties on individual level political knowledge 
Previous studies pointed out that, especially as a consequence of their linkage 
function (Eldersveld and Walton 2000; Epstein, 1986; Katz, 1990; Merkl, 2005), one of 
the most important roles of parties is to provide information and cues to their supporters 
which would in turn help them evaluate the complex and remote world of politics 
(Campbell et al., 1960; Katz, 1990). Taking this idea into account, it is reasonable to 
expect that some parties perform better than others at the task. This is especially true in 
post-communist countries where initial partisanship was based on limited political 
information. In these cases we can talk about “double blind” conditions: voters had little 
knowledge about the agendas of competing candidates and parties or about how the rules 
of competition might affect electoral outcomes; and, at the same time, they operated 
without experience on how other voters had behaved in the past (Evans and Whitefield, 
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2002). Additionally, this process continued even in the later stage of democratic 
consolidation of Central and Eastern Europe as the market economy and the path to EU 
membership presented new challenges (Enyedi and Toka, 2007). Here is where parties 
played an important role in structuring the environment in which they act by re-profiling 
their electorate (Enyedi, 2005). This implies a process of (re-)“educating” supporters, 
hence making them more sophisticated. Consequently, in this environment parties played 
a substantial role in providing the population with precious knowledge, helping 
individuals to navigate in environments characterized by constant economic and political 
changes (Enyedi and Toka, 2007). And what is also relevant is that certain parties were 
more successful than others in doing this, e.g. FIDESZ in Hungary (Enyedi, 2005).   
Of course the above described process can be perceived as a consequence of the 
effort that parties’ make in supplying cues and information to their voters. More 
precisely, during their effort to mobilize support (e.g. electoral campaigns, party 
congresses), parties shape their supporters’ views about the political arena (Converse, 
1964; Craig and Hurley 1984; Field and Anderson, 1969; Jacoby, 1995; Nie and 
Anderson, 1974; Nie and Rabjohn, 1979) thus raising the political sophistication levels of 
the above-mentioned supporters. To be more specific, in the process of political 
communication (which is more intense during periods of mobilization) parties inevitably 
provide their followers with information.  The information coming from parties might be 
biased, as we can expect that party supporters will favor information that is congenial to 
their initial attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken, 1998; Gaines et al. 2007; Lodge and Taber 2000; 
Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller, 1992) but I argue that even this biased information can be 
useful. For example, when parties criticize the state of the economy (even if on the wrong 
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grounds) by simply mentioning in the debate the name of the finance minister, they can 
bring an increase in political knowledge. In the same way, whenever parties communicate 
their message, (even if the information is biased), partisans can learn more about who is 
the leader of that party, familiarize themselves with a particular salient issue and have a 
vague idea where the other parties stand on the same matter. And when we compare this 
to a baseline where most citizens are chronically ignorant about political matters 
(Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Popkin, 1994; Zaller, 1992), it can 
contribute to the increase of political knowledge and thus of political sophistication. 
Connecting this to the idea of the triad, it does show an increase in the opportunities 
supporters of a party have to get informed and, at the same time, it lowers the level of 
abilities required for them to process the message - considering that it is a clear one and it 
simplifies reality. 
 But, as pointed out earlier, the increase in the level of sophistication of party 
followers is also a secondary consequence of the mobilization process. This can be 
viewed as a two-step process where parties, by playing a substantial role in mobilizing 
their supporters (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; 
Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994) increase their level of political participation and thus 
contribute to increasing the level of sophistication (Bennett, 1975; Junn, 1991; Leighley,  
1995; Tan, 1980). The mechanism is rather simple - when parties mobilize their followers 
they inevitably engage them in the political process raising their level of political interest 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992) and, hence, leading to higher levels of political 
sophistication.  
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Ultimately, when parties put more effort in mobilizing supporters, they provide 
them with a higher amount of information and raise their political interest. Therefore, we 
can expect parties that are much more active in engaging their supporters through 
mobilization would also do a better job at providing them with information and 
increasing their level of political interest. The general expectation would then be that 
there is a positive relation between supporting parties who are more motivated to 
mobilize their followers and the level of political sophistication Thus, the general 
expectation is that Thus, the general expectation is thatsupporters of parties who are 
more motivated to mobilize their followers will be more politically sophisticated.  
As previously mentioned the causal path between supporting a certain party and 
the level of political sophistication might be questioned. As previously mentioned, the 
causal path between supporting a certain party and the level of political sophistication 
might be questioned. Previous studies do indeed show that the level of political 
knowledge has an impact on one’s vote choice (Bartels, 1996; Toka and Popescu, 2008), 
but we need to remember that partisanship and vote choice are different concepts. 
Partisanship has broader implications than voting preferences or even voting loyalties, as 
it has a much stronger influence on political attitudes and on how voters think about the 
political world (Campbell et al., 1960; Lodge and Hamill, 1986). Also, while vote choice is 
influenced by short term forces such as economic conditions (e.g. Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Bect et al., 2008; Powell and Whitten, 1993) and leader 
evaluations/popularity (e.g. Abramowitz, 1985; Rosema 2006), partisanship was generally 
showed to be immune to such forces and hence more stable (Campbell et al., 1960; 
Green and Palmquist, 1994; Green et al. ,2002;  Green and Schickler, 2009; Zuckerman et 
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al., 2007). Therefore we can expect that the mechanism through which vote choice and 
partisanship relate to political sophistication are different. In fact while political 
sophistication was considered as a predictor for vote choice (Bartles, 1996; Toka and 
Popescu, 2008), at least to my knowledge, no such relation was established between 
political knowledge and partisanship3.  
Moreover iIf we accept the reverse causal mechanism that would mean that an 
increase/decrease in the level of political sophistication would lead to a change in 
partisanship, but this is unlikely for reasons enumerated in what follows. First of all, 
partisanship provides a sense of “we feeling” that is stronger than other psychological 
constructs and attitudes (Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002; Lazarsfeld et al., 1949; 
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).  And even if we don’t accept that this identity feeling is based 
on a ‘primary’ social group (i.e. religion, class, region etc.) (Lazarsfeld et al., 1949; Lipset 
and Rokkan,1967) but is based on ‘secondary’ groups (i.e parties or the partisan group) 
(Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002) it can still be deduced that partisanship is the 
cause, not the consequence, of less stable, attitudes, opinions and evaluations (Bartle and 
Bellucci, 2009: 5.)4. Thus it is not surprising that the stability of partisanship and its 
immunity to short term forces was shown to be true not only in a US context (Campbell 
et al., 1960; Converse ,1969; Dalton, 1980; Green and Palmquist, 1990; 1994; Green et al. 
,2002;  Goren, 2005) but also across contexts (Green et al., 2002; Green and Schickler, 
2009; Schickler and Green, 1997; Zuckerman et al., 2007) and even in Eastern European 
countries such Russia (Back and Teorell, 2009: 170). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
any findings that point to the instability of partisanship (e.g. Achen, 1975; Thomassen, 
1976) are a result of measurement error and these findings are rejected once the error is 
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corrected for (Green and Schickler, 2009; Schickler and Green, 1997).  And even if 
fluctuations in partisanship are recorded they are more likely to be changes from partisan 
to nonpartisan (hence these cases will be excluded from my analysis) than switches 
between parties (Clarke et al., 2009; Neundorf et al., 2011).  All in all it is safe to infer that 
partisanship is stable and very unlikely to be affected by changes in political knowledge. 
Additionally, given that a large proportion of party supporters “inherit” the partisanship 
of their parents through the process of early socialization (Dalton, 1980; Kroh and Selb, 
2009), it seems largely implausible that the level of political knowledge leads to 
supporting a certain party. 
Another argument against reverse causality lies in the way people process 
information.  It has been argued that individuals tend to favor information favorable to 
their partisan orientation, a process known as “selective exposure” (Campbell et al., 1960; 
Stroud, 2008). Furthermore, studies on information processing show that “motivated 
reasoning” is crucial to how citizens acquire and incorporate information – in other 
words, citizens accept and incorporate more easily information that is consistent with 
their preexisting views and, at the same time, put substantial cognitive efforts to counter-
argue information that contradicts their preexisting views (Gaines et al., 2007; Lodge and 
Hamill 1986; Lodge and Taber, 2000; Taber and Lodge, 2006).  Therefore it is highly 
unlikely that a biased increase in information would change one’s partisanship (i.e. 
mechanism implied if reverse causality were to be true); on the contrary - political 
learning will only reinforce existing partisan predispositions (Highton, 2012; Stroud, 
2008).  
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Last but not least, accepting reverse causality in the context of this paper would 
imply accepting that people with higher levels of political knowledge are more inclined to 
support specific parties with a particular set of characteristics. This, in turn, equates with 
saying that more politically sophisticated individuals are, for example, more inclined to 
support parties advocating for specific policies grounded in specific sets of values (e.g. 
parties that belong to a certain ideological family or are situated to the right/left of the 
political spectrum).  I find it difficult, if not close to a sophistic argumentation, to spell 
out a plausible line of reasoning that explains how and why more politically 
knowledgeable individuals would be attracted by particular parties. Consequently, I do 
not see any reason to believe that there is an a priori impact from knowledge on 
preferring a party based on ideological attributes or, for that matter, based on other types 
of characteristics (e.g. organizational characteristics, size, incumbency, coherence, 
fragmentation). In fact, such a link would imply that the sense of identity that lies at the 
base of partisanship (Lazarsfeld et al., 1949; Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002 
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) would be influenced by the above mentioned characteristics.  
Therefore, I argue that the level of political sophistication is dependent on which 
party one supports and reverse causality is at best implausible. As explained in earlier 
sections, variation in party characteristics affects the motivation of parties to offer cues 
and mobilize their supporters. I generally consider that parties with higher incentives to 
challenge the status quo are more motivated to inform and mobilize their followers. Thus 
I expect that: opposition, smaller parties and parties that are more to the right of the 
political spectrum (this last one valid only for the context of Central and Eastern 
Europe), put more effort in mobilizing support leading to a higher level of political 
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sophistication within their followers. Aside from having an unconditional direct effect, I 
also expect that the impact of these characteristics would be moderated by the individual 
characteristics of the party’s supporters. In general, the increase of political knowledge 
provided by supporting parties that challenge the status quo should be especially helpful 
for those who cannot rely on their own resources to gather information about the 
political environment. Therefore, I expect that the positive impact that these parties have 
on the level of sophistication of their supporters should be stronger for those having 
lower level of cognitive abilities (the less educated) and for those who are less motivated 
to acquire information on the own ( the less frequent media users).  
The main challengers of the status quo are normally the non-incumbent parties, or 
in other words the opposition parties. If we consider that the main role of parties is to 
gain office, these parties are the most motivated to inform their followers and mobilize 
support in order to (re)gain access to power. Thus they will invest the most in 
mobilization campaigns during which they will put the most effort in communicating 
their message, hence providing more cues and involving their supporters in the political 
process, thus leading to an increase in the political sophistication of their followers. Thus: 
H1: Supporters of opposition parties will be more sophisticated.  
In this case of incumbency I expect a different interaction effect that the one 
stated above. I expect that as only partisans with higher cognitive abilities (the more 
educated) have the skills to overcome the obstacles, e.g. state controlled media (Djankov 
et al., 2003), posed by incumbents, the effect of supporting an opposition party will be 
stronger and statistically significant among this group. Hence: 
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H 1.1: The positive effect of supporting an opposition party is stronger among those 
having higher level of education. 
In the case of media usage the effect might be ambiguous; on the one hand 
the supporters of non-incumbent parties that are “heavy” media users should have 
more access to the information provided by the party. On the other hand, we can 
also expect a media bias towards the incumbent (Besley and Prat, 2006).  
I also expect that the supporters of small parties (see Appendix 3 for the 
operationalization of small parties) are more informed since these parties, in their effort 
to challenge the status quo and enter the political arena, are motivated in offering cues 
and mobilizing support. In general, they try to do this through direct communication 
with their followers because, as they are not major political actors, the media does not 
provide extensive coverage of their message. Thus: 
H2: Supporters of small parties are generally more informed. 
Here I also expect that media usage and education could have a moderating role. 
In this case, the interaction effect should follow the general pattern mentioned before. 
The positive effect of supporting a small party will be stronger among those supporters 
without the personal attributes necessary to acquire political information (the lower 
educated and the lower media users). Thus:  
H 2.1: The positive effect that supporting a small party has on political sophistication is 
stronger for the less educated. 
H 2.2: The positive effect that supporting a small party has on political sophistication is 
stronger for the less frequent media users. 
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 The third characteristic to be taken into consideration is the position of the 
party on the left-right axis (see Appendix 3 for description of the party positioning 
variable). I argue that in the case of post-communist countries we can expect that 
after the regime change right wing parties were more motivated to mobilize 
support as they were the ones challenging the status quo. Therefore they had to 
educate their followers about the institutional framework of the newly emerged 
democratic environment. At the same time left wing parties (which generally are 
the successor parties, and thus interested in maintaining the status quo), could rely 
on the support of the nostalgics of the old regime or losers of the transition 
(Kitschelt, 1992), and feel less motivated to actively mobilize support. In other 
words, while left wing parties have a base for their support, right wing parties need 
to make a substantial effort in educating individuals about the new political 
environment in order to attract voters and change the status quo (Evans and 
Whitefield, 2002). Hence we can assume that their supporters will be better 
informed about the new political environment. Or, having in mind the framework 
of Page and Shapiro (1991), rightist parties provide patterns of information that 
favor learning about the democratic political environment and offer their 
supporters more stimuli to get informed and engaged in politics. One such 
example is FIDESZ, the most relevant right wing party in Hungary, which played 
an important role - greater than any of the other parties - in educating their 
supporters in the post-communist environment (Enyedi, 2005).  Hence: 
 H3: As right wing parties are more motivated to mobilize supporters, they provide more 
information and cues, thus their supporters are more politically sophisticated. 
16 
 
Furthermore, I expect that the effect of supporting a party is stronger for the less 
educated and those with lower levels of media usage. The logic is the same as for small 
parties, these are supporters who are most likely to benefit from the mobilization and 
communication efforts of rightist parties since they neither have the abilities nor are 
exposed to other sources of information that would help them navigate the complex 
political environment of post-communist societies. Therefore: 
H 3.1: The positive effect that supporting a rightist party has on political sophistication is 
stronger for the less educated partisans.  
H 3.2: The positive effect that supporting a rightist party has on political sophistication is 
stronger for the partisans with lower levels of media usage 
Research design and variables 
The data used in this paper comes from Eurequal FP6 2007, a project that 
provides standardized questionnaire items in thirteen East European countries. The 
countries were Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. A clustered random 
sample of approximately 1,000 respondents was interviewed in each of these countries It 
is important to remember that in this analysis only party supporters were taken into 
consideration. The hypotheses enumerated above cannot be tested for the non-
supporters since none of the party characteristics apply to them.  
The rich institutional environment in which parties in these countries act and the 
large variety of parties, offers the possibility to extensively study the effects of party 
support on individual level political knowledge.  Also, as mentioned before, the 
tremendous economic and political changes of post-communist countries after 1989 
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forced citizens to learn a lot in a very short time, and this process of learning was largely 
moderated by political parties (Enyedi and Toka, 2007). Hence in these countries we can 
expect a strong effect of party characteristics on political sophistication. 
The dependent variable used in this study is political sophistication. This is 
operationalized employing three widely used indicators (constructed as an additive scale, 
see Appendix 1 for details) that reflect the same unidimensional concept: factual 
knowledge about politics, interest in politics and opinionation, as an imperfect proxy for 
political cognition, (Lau and Erber, 1985; Zaller, 1990). For this specific dataset I prefer 
to use the broader concept of political sophistication instead of using the term factual 
political knowledge, since I consider that the restricted choice of just two dichotomous 
knowledge quiz items (resulting in a three point “continuous” variable with a uniform 
distribution) is not sufficient to accurately evaluate one’s political knowledge. Second, if 
parties do indeed offer their supporters cues, they should be related to providing a 
foundation for their attitudes, hence contribute to increasing their level of opinionation 
in at least an equal manner. Third, in the process of mobilization parties engage their 
supporters in politics, increasing their level of political interest (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 
1992). Thus the dependent variable will not only capture the impact of party mobilization 
on factual knowledge but will also capture its effects on the formation of attitudes 
(opinionation) and engagement (interest). Last but not least, it should be pointed out 
again that political sophistication and political knowledge reflect the same unidimensional 
concept, thus the results presented in this paper hold across the two operationalizations. 
The individual level variables are those described in the previous section and  have 
already been widely used in the literature to explain political sophistication. Education 
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will be used as an indicator for cognitive abilities (Luskin ,1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996) while media exposure, which generally reflects motivation to get informed, will be 
operationalized through the usage of newspapers and TV. Other socio-demographic 
controls that were shown to be relevant for political knowledge: gender, age, minority 
status, religiosity, income, type of residence, will also be used (see Appendix 2 for a 
detailed description).  
As mentioned before, three variables are considered for the second level: the 
position of the party, party size and if the party is in government or not (see Appendix 3 
for a detailed description). 
In order to test my hypotheses I will use a multilevel model having at the first 
level individuals who will be nested in parties (the second level, units). Due to 
methodological concerns, more exactly biased parameters and inaccurate confidence 
intervals, parties with less than 20 supporters were eliminated from the analysis (Hox, 
2010: 235)5, subsequently their supporters were also excluded from the analysis6. 
Therefore, the final sample size consists of 4504 party supporters, nested in 54 parties. 
Also in order to ensure that the variation of the second level is a result of party 
characteristics and not of national characteristics, country dummies were included at the 
first level. Finally, since the cross level interactions are the focus of this research, group 
mean centering was used for individual level variables and grand mean centering was used 
for second level variables (Enders and Tofighi, 2004).  
The analysis was done using the HLM 6.08 package using restricted maximum 
likelihood (REML)7. Three level models (supporters nested in parties, parties nested in 
countries) were run yielding similar results to the two level models with country 
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dummies, but these later models were preferred because the correction for clustered 
standard errors was not possible for the 3-level model due to the small number of level 3 
cases (only 12 countries). 
Empirical analysis 
A series of multilevel models will be presented which will test the relationship 
between the above mentioned party characteristics and political sophistication. Model 1  
is the baseline model that only includes the intercept and country dummies. This model 
will be used as the base to evaluate model fit. It also shows that the intercept varies 
substantially across parties, indicating that the level of sophistication differs between 
supporters of different parties.  
In Model 2 all the individual level predictors of political knowledge are 
introduced and the slopes of the media usage variable and that of education are left to 
vary across the nesting units, in this case parties. This model confirms previous findings 
in the literature - increased media usage, higher levels of education, being older and male, 
all have a positive effect on political sophistication, while being a member of a minority 
and living in a rural area, have a negative impact on political sophistication. Here we can 
notice that there is also substantial variation in the effect of media usage and education 
on political sophistication between supporters of different parties. This supports the 
claim that the cues individuals get from their party are strongly influenced by their media 
usage and cognitive abilities. Last but not least, the fact that a substantial part of the total 
variance of political sophistication is at the second level, the party, makes a multi-level 
analysis not only justifiable but also necessary.    
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[Table 1 around here] 
 
The first thing that can be noted about Model 3 is that it performs better than a 
model with only random slopes (Model 2), this being shown by the reduction of the AIC 
(Akaike Information Criteria) and deviance. Also the log likelihood comparison shows 
that Model 3 fits the data significantly better than both Model 2 (chi-square difference is 
21.625 sig at p<0.05) and Model 1 (chi-square difference is 437.49 sig at p<0.001).  
Second when looking at these models we can notice that most of the main effects are not 
statistically significant. Still, one of the macro variables is statistically significant, pointing 
in the expected direction, the position on the left right axis. This confirms the initial 
expectations that supporters of parties more to the right of the axis are more politically 
sophisticated. As hypothesized above, this can be a consequence of the fact that rightist 
parties are the ones who are more motivated to change the status-quo. 
Looking at Models 3, the more interesting findings are related to the significant 
interaction effects between the individual level predictors of political sophistication and 
the party characteristics. This shows that the effect of party characteristics on political 
sophistication is moderated by how the message of the parties and their mobilization 
efforts are perceived among individuals having different levels of education and media 
usage. Furthermore one need to notice the random variance on both education and 
media usage is considerably reduced when adding the cross level interactions, showing 
that party characteristics help explain a substantial part of the variance in political 
sophistication. 
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 Since the main effect was statistically significant, the first set of interactions to 
be analyzed is the one between the position of the party on the left right axis, education 
and media usage. The interaction between party position and education is statistically 
significant going in a negative direction.  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Looking at Figure 1 helps to interpret this effect.  Hence we can see that the 
positive effect of supporting a party that is more to the right is only statistically significant 
for the least educated partisans.  As expected, in their process of mobilization rightist 
parties are more successful in providing information and cues to those who need it the 
most. More specifically, supporting a rightist party generates an increase in the level of 
political sophistication for those who do not have the necessary cognitive abilities (i.e. 
low levels of education) that would help them navigate the complex political environment 
of post-communist societies without the help of their party. Another thing to be noted is 
once the level of education increases there is no difference between the supporters of 
leftist and rightist parties. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
Just like the interaction between party position and education, the interaction 
between party position and media usage is statistically significant, and has a negative sign.  
Furthermore when looking at Figure 2 we can see very similar patterns to those in Figure 
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1. Again the position of the party (i.e. supporting a party that is more to the right) has a 
positive and statistically significant effect only for the lowest educated partisans. The 
explanation is the same previously noted - supporting a rightist party is only helpful for 
those who are less motivated to acquire information on the own (the less frequent media 
users), and hence mainly rely on their party to supply them with information.  Also in this 
case we can notice that for the heavy media users the position of their preferred party 
does not have an effect on political sophistication. 
This leads to the conclusion that for individuals with low levels of education and 
media usage right wing parties are better in providing cues than left wing parties. This 
pattern is not surprising given that in the post-Communist context right wing parties are 
the ones who need to gather supporters by educating them about the new democratic 
environment (Evans and Whitefield, 2002); as a result they contribute  more to increasing 
the level of sophistication of their followers. And this is especially the case for those 
supporters who have neither the ability nor the motivation to gather information on their 
own, hence they rely on the information and cues that parties provide in the process of 
mobilization. 
If the effect of supporting a party that is more to the right confirmed all previous 
expectations, the effect of supporting a small party is not unconditional direct (the main 
effect is not statistically significant) but it is only significant in interactions with the level 
of education. Moreover, the somewhat puzzling positive sign of this interaction is 
clarified only when looking at Figure 3. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
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This shows party size has a negative and statistically significant effect only for the 
lower educated voters. Thus for the less educated the advantage, in terms of 
sophistication, comes from supporting smaller parties.  And this is expected since, as they 
do not have the necessary abilities, they represent the group which needs to rely on cues 
and mobilizing efforts of their party in the process of learning about the political 
environment.  
The last interactions to be analyzed are the ones that refer to incumbency, more 
exactly being an opposition party, as a motivational incentive to fight the status quo by 
informing and mobilizing supporters. Looking at Models 3 in Table 1 we can see that 
although the interactions with media usage are not statistically significant, the one with 
education is.   
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
 Looking at Figure 4 we can see that only the sophistication level of the highest 
educated voters is positively influenced by supporting an opposition party. If rightist and 
smaller parties are more successful in mobilizing lower status voters, non-incumbent 
parties are more successful in raising the level of information of more educated voters. A 
possible explanation for this is that in order to be receptive to the message of the non-
incumbent, their followers need to have higher abilities to overcome possible obstacles, 
e.g. state controlled media (Djankov et al., 2003), posed by incumbents. At the same time, 
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for those with lower abilities, it is harder to identify the message of their party in an 
environment dominated by the incumbents.   
Conclusions 
In this paper I explored the link between parties and individual level political 
sophistication. I argued that, since one of the most important roles of political parties is 
to offer information and cues that will help their supporters gain knowledge about the 
constantly shifting political arena (Campbell et al., 1960; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998), 
parties should have a significant influence on the level of political sophistication. And this 
should especially be the case in post-communist countries where parties are the main 
suppliers of knowledge, helping individuals navigate the ever evolving political 
environment (Enyedi, 2005; Enyedi and Toka, 2007). The mechanism through which 
parties fulfill this role can be a direct one - in which parties during the process of 
mobilization constantly supply information to their supporters (Campbell et al., 1960). 
But it can also be a consequence of party mobilization which, by having an impact on 
political participation, leads to higher levels of political sophistication (Bennett, 1975; 
Junn, 1991; Leighley, 1995; Tan, 1980).  
 I argued that the variation in the amount and quality of information that parties 
provide to their supporters has an influence on the political sophistication of these 
supporters. Three party characteristics (position on left-right axis, incumbency and party 
size) are considered important for the level of political sophistication of their followers. 
Left wing parties, opposition and small parties are the ones challenging the status quo, 
hence they engage in a more intense process of mobilization, resulting in higher levels of 
political sophistication for their supporters. 
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 Assuming that political sophistication does not impact the party one supports, 
Tthis paper showed that all three characteristics have a systematic effect on political 
sophistication either alone (i.e. party placement) or in combination with media usage and 
education. Thus I demonstrate not only how the average level of sophistication varies 
across supporters of different parties but more importantly how the impact of party 
characteristics is moderated by education and media usage.  
The empirical analysis mainly confirms the initial expectations. In the case of 
party placement, being a supporter of parties that are more to the right is associated with 
higher levels of political sophistication; the interactions reveal that these parties do a 
better job in engaging and informing those who do not have the attributes to seek and 
process information on their own. Hence, without having the motivation or the ability to 
learn about the constantly changing political environment, they rely more on the 
mobilization efforts of their party of choice. A similar mechanism was shown to be 
present in the case of small parties which have a positive effect on the level of 
sophistication only for those who cannot rely on their own cognitive capabilities, i.e. the 
lower educated, to gather and process information.  
For incumbency the situation is rather different, as in this case the interaction is 
only statistically significant for the most educated. Thus, being the follower of opposition 
parties is beneficial only for the most educated supporters, since they have the necessary 
abilities to overcome possible obstacles posed by incumbents (e.g. state controlled media) 
and gain most from the information and engagement supplied by these parties. 
To sum up, this paper expands on what Campbell et al. argued 50 years ago: one 
of the most important roles of parties is to provide information and cues that would help 
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their followers evaluate politics. Not only that but this relation is expected to be stronger 
in an environment in which parties have a very important role in informing their 
followers (Enyedi, 2005; Enyedi and Toka, 2007).  
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Notes: 
1. The countries are Bulgaria (BG), the Czech Republic (CR), Estonia (EE), Hungary 
(HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Moldova (ML), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), 
Russia (RU), Slovakia (SK) and the Ukraine (UA). 
2. Additionally older citizens living in urban areas, who often discuss politics, and have 
strong partisan attachments, are generally more informed. Also, being a female or a 
member of a minority are important determinants of political knowledge, having a 
negative impact on political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 179; Luskin, 
1990).  
2.3. On the contrary the strength of partisanship is considered an important predictor of 
political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Grönlund and Milner, 2006) 
3.4. Even if accept the view that partisanship represents an attitude (Price, 1992; Greene, 
2002 ;Popkin, 1994), attitudes towards parties are stronger than towards other 
political objects with similar influences as identities (Bartle and Belluci 2009). Hence 
even this view is consistent with the stability of partisanship. 
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4.5. The general rule of thumb is that a sample of 30 groups with at least 30 individual per 
groups, hence the name ‘30/30 rule’, will be sufficient for accurately estimating 
parameters and standard errors (Kreft, 1996). Still if there is interest in cross level 
interactions, as is the case in this paper, Hox recommends a larger number of groups, 
more exactly 50 groups with a minimum of 20 individuals per group (Hox, 2010: 
325). Furthermore including these cases in the analysis leads to similar conclusions  
(see Appendix 7) 
5.6. Due to the fact that in Belarus all parties had less than 20 supporters in the survey, 
this country was excluded from the analysis. 
6.7. The analysis conducted using R lme4 package lead to very similar results. 
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